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Taking	aims	seriously—how	legal	ecology	affects	judicial	
decision-making		
	
This	article	reflects	upon	key	challenges	that	ecology	as	a	field	of	science	has	brought	to	
modern	environmental	law	as	it	operates	within	civil	law	systems.	An	example	from	
European	water	management	regulation	elucidates	how	the	traditional	perception	of	
judicial	decision-making	as	deductive	reasoning	does	not	match	the	current	reality	
because	factual	and	normative	premises	are	no	longer	as	distinct	as	presumed.	A	novel	
way	of	formulating	judicial	decisions	is	accordingly	presented:	legal	ecology—which	
aims	to	provide	one	answer	to	the	search	for	more	mature	environmental	
methodologies.	Legal	ecology	is	based	on	the	writings	of	the	late	Ronald	Dworkin	and	
especially	of	Robert	Alexy,	whose	concept	of	principles	as	optimisation	requirements	is	
adapted	to	fulfill	the	execution	of	the	aim-setting	sections	frequently	used	in	
environmental	regulation.	Adjudication	with	legal	ecology	is	understood	to	be	rooted	in	
normative	sources	but	to	be	more	transparent,	open	to	scrutiny	and	to	invite	more	
evolved	argumentative	development	than	is	currently	the	practise	in	civil	law	
environmental	adjudication.	As	such,	the	suggested	approach	might	also	benefit	
argumentation	in	the	sphere	of	human	rights	and	the	environment	in	general—or	any	
other	field	where	aims	ought	to	be	balanced	or	value	choice	made	visibile	without	
compromising	the	requirements	of	legal	certainty.	
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	1	INTRODUCTION:	RAIDERS	OF	THE	LOST	METHOD		Environmental	law	as	a	distinct	field	of	law	has	existed	for	decades	now,	but	the	truth	about	the	adolescent	nature	of	the	discipline	has	been	more	or	less	widely	known—especially	since	a	few	years	ago	the	issue	was	raised	by	respected	scholars	in	the	field.1	In	the	most	recent	analysis,	the	reasons	behind	the	immature	nature	of	environmental	law	were	skillfully	laid	out,	and	the	means	to	achieving	greater	maturity	were	identified	as	being	the	need	to	face	up	to	the	challenges	of	methodology.2		 Methodology	in	science	involves	answering	the	question	‘How?’—how	the	results	are	reached.	Methodology	is	always	entwined	with	a	research	theme	and	a	
																																																								
1	Elizabeth	 Fisher	 and	 others,	 'Maturity	 and	Methodology:	 Starting	 a	 Debate	 about	Environmental	Law	Scholarship'	(2009)	21(2)	Journal	of	Environmental	Law	213,	cf.	David	M.	Driesen,	'Thirty	Years	of	International	Environmental	Law:	A	Retrospective	and	Plea	for	Reinvigoration'	(2003)	30(2)	Syracuse	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Commerce	353,	and	see	Dan	Tarlock,	'Is	There	a	There	There	in	Environmental	Law?'	(2004)	19(2)	Journal	of	Land	Use	and	Environmental	Law	213.	
2	Ibid	Fisher	et	al,	‘Maturity	and	Methodology’	226–43.	
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hypothesis	preceding	the	research.3	Accordingly,	tackling	methodological	challenges	in	a	stand	alone	fashion	in	a	project-independent	article	is	something	of	an	impossible	task.	Despite	this,		the	task	must	be	attempted	and	its	challenge	can	be	eased	by	carefully	setting	the	scene	in	which	the	methodological	approach	under	examination	in	this	article	has	evolved	and	by	laying	out	the	instances	to	which	it	can	be	applied.		 The	motivation	for	framing	legal	ecology	as	presented	in	this	article	mainly	derives	from	two	previously	noted	challenges	of	environmental	law:	the	interdisciplinarity	of	the	field	and	its	general	lack	of	engagement	with	legal	theory.4	Here,	interdisciplinarity	means	the	challenges	that	ecology	presents	for	environmental	law—how	ecological	knowledge	is	currently	used	in	existing	regulation	and	what	challenges	this	deployment	of	knowledge	poses.	The	example	used	in	the	discussion	that	follows	is	taken	from	EU	law:	the	implementation	and	interpretation	of	the	Water	Framework	Directive.	The	fundamental	research	question	animating	the	present	enquiry	is:	how	could	the	aims	written	in	law	be	fully	reflected	
at	the	point	of	application?		Such	aims,	typically	contained	in	the	first	paragraphs	of	statutes,	formulate	the	intentions	of	the	legislative	body	and	state	the	goals	they	had	
																																																								
3	The	 theoretical	 framework	 does	 not	 (necessarily)	 equate	 with	 the	 methodology	chosen	 for	 the	 study;	 research	 can	 raise	 even	 highly	 theoretical	 questions	 as	 to	 its	theme	and	still	be	vague	as	to	its	methodological	commitments.	
4	Fisher	et	al,	‘Maturity	and	Methodology’	(n	1)	231−35	and	246−47,	even	though	for	the	authors	the	latter	is	more	of	a	suggestion	for	action	than	an	identified	challenge.	
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in	mind,	are	currently	all	too	soon	overlooked.5	To	answer	this	question	is	to	answer	the	question	of	how	the	values	motivating	environmental	regulation	could	be	taken	into	consideration	when	the	regulation	is	applied—such	motivating	values	being	mainly	concerned	with	such	matters	as	preserving	nature,	increasing	ecological	sustainability	and	so	forth.	6		2	LEGAL	ECOLOGY:	JUST	REINVENTING	THE	WHEEL?			The	aim	of	the	present	article	is	to	join	the	contemporary	discussion	by	presenting	a		conception	of	legal	ecology	as	a	methodological	choice	for	environmental	law.	Legal	ecology	offers	a	way	to	achieve	full	adherence	to	the	existing	but	to	some	extent	neglected	first	sections	of	statutes—addressing	how	the	aims	in	them	can	be	balanced	with	other,	even	competing	aims.	It	is	suggested	that	weighing	and	balancing	can	be	conducted	formally,	in	a	manner	familiar	from	the	application	of	fixed	rules,	which	transparency	and	open-endedness	of	reasoning	might	enhance.	Also,	the	structure	suggested	here	might	be	put	into	practice	elsewhere—where,	for	
																																																								
5	The	 practise	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Administrative	 Court	 of	 Finland	 is	 an	 illustrative	example	of	how	rarely	a	court	of	a	civil	law	country	is	willing	to	implement	those	first	paragraphs	of	environmental	statutes	that	include	specified	aims:	see	text	at	n	54-5.	
6	The	 challenges	 investigated	 and	 the	 answers	 given	 are	 examined	 in	 the	 civil	 law	context.	Whether	 the	 results	 can	 be	 used	 in	 the	 common	 law	 system	 is	 a	 separate	question	and	not	pursued	here.	
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example,	collision	of	different	right-based	objectives	occurs.	The	final	section	of	the	article	offers	reasons	why	the	approach	could	also	be	seen	as	a	normatively	binding	tool	for	interpretation	in	judicial	decision-making	in	general	and	not	only	as	a	methodological	choice	for	environmental	law	scholars.		
2.1	Point	of	departure:	rättsekologi		What	is	legal	ecology?	The	point	of	departure	for	the	approach	can	be	found	in	the	work	of	Staffan	Westerlund.	In	Westerlund’s	analysis	of	the	discipline	of	environmental	law	he	concludes	that	something	called	rättsekologi	(‘law’s	ecology’,	‘the	ecological	evaluation	of	law’	or	‘legal	ecology’—to	use	the	preferred	translation	of	the	term	in	the	present	article)	should	be	used	to	fulfill	the	expectations	set	for	environmental	law.	Westerlund	claims	that	the	empirical	lack	of	ecological	sustainability	should	be	taken	into	the	discipline	of	law	itself	instead	of	being	seen	as	something	non-legal,	something	outside	the	sphere	of	law,	while	with	regard	to	the	longing	for	maturity	in	environmental	law,	Westerlund	asserts	that	solving	genuine	problems	is	what	separates	mature	sciences	from	immature	ones.7	
																																																								
7	Staffan	Westerlund,	 ’Rätt	och	riktigt	rättveteskap’	2010	Nordic	Environmental	Law	Journal	2010:1	<http://www.nordiskmiljoratt.se/>	accessed	18	February	2014	3,	11,	18.	In	the	article	Westerlund	goes	through	the	problems	environmental	law	has	had	as	a	discipline,	similarly	as	Fisher	et	al.	in	the	above-mentioned	article		(Fisher	et	al,	‘Maturity	and	Methodology’	(n	1)).	Naturally	Westerlund	is	not	alone	in	his	desire	for	
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	 Westerlund	claims	that	in	states	functioning	under	the	rule	of	law,	legal	problems	are	inherently	bound	up	with	ecological	ones.	This	entanglement	causes	a	legal	and	ecological	dilemma—and	in	order	for	legal	science	to	be	proactive,	the	joint	problem	must	be	solved.8	The	problem	can	only	be	resolved	by	tackling	the	methodological	problem—by	re-setting	the	theoretical	aspects	of	the	field	of	law	anew.	Since	the	old	paradigm	of	positivism	does	not	meet	the	challenge,	rättsekologi	is	constructed	as	an	answer.9	
																																																																																																																																																																							a	better	relationship	between	sustainability	and	law	–	for	an	overview	of	the	concept,	see	 Klaus	 Bosselmann,	 The	 Principle	 of	 Sustainability:	 Transforming	 Law	 and	
Governance	 (Ashgate,	 Aldershot	 2008),	 Hans	 Christian	 Bugge	 and	 Christina	 Voigt,	
Sustainable	 development	 in	 international	 and	 national	 law:	what	 did	 the	 Brundtland	
report	 do	 to	 legal	 thinking	 and	 legal	 development,	 and	where	 can	we	 go	 from	 here?	(The	 Avosetta	 series;	8,	 Europa	 Law	 Publishing	 2008)	 or	 	 Alan	 Boyle	 and	 David	Freestone	 (eds),	 International	 Law	and	 Sustainable	Development:	 Past	Achievements	
and	Future	Challenges	(Oxford	University	Press	1999).	A	somewhat	critical	approach	to	 the	use	of	 the	 concept	 is	presented	by	Vaughan	Lowe,	 ‘Sustainable	Development	and	Unsustainable	Arguments’	in	Boyle	&	Freestone	eds.	
8	Westerlund,	’Rätt	och	riktigt	rättveteskap’	(n	7)	18.	
9	Westerlund,	’Rätt	och	riktigt	rättveteskap’	(n	7)	3,	20,	22.	For	other	reactions	to	the	disappointment	of	positivism	cf.	Bebhinn	Donnelly	and	Patrick	Bishop,	 'Natural	Law	and	Ecocentrism'	 (2007)	 19(1)	 Journal	 of	 Environmental	 Law,	 Jonathan	 I.	 Charney,	'Universal	 International	 Law'	 (1993)	 87(4)	 The	 American	 Journal	 of	 International	
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	 As	Westerlund	puts	it,			 [e]very	legal	scholar,	and	also	other	scholars,	who	aim[s]	to	tackle	the	problem	of	insufficient	ecological	sustainability	must	accept	that	it	is	these	questions	that	define	the	paradigm—or	else	it	goes	all	wrong.10			In	other	words,	the	problem	the	legal	action	aims	to	address	is	not	seen	as	the	target:	the	problem	is	integral	to	the	framing	of	the	legal	question.	Having	elaborated	on	
rättsekologi’s	roots,	Westerlund	proceeds	to	give	examples	of	what	would	change	if	eco-sustainability	were	to	define	the	paradigm	of	law.	In	his	view,	it	would	bring	a	feedback	system	to	the	law	itself,	a	systemic	resilience	familiar	from	elements	of	
																																																																																																																																																																							Law	 or	 David	 Delaney,	 Law	 and	 nature	 (Cambridge	 Studies	 in	 Law	 and	 Society,	Cambridge	University	Press	2003).	
10	Westerlund,	 ’Rätt	 och	 riktigt	 rättveteskap’	 (n	 7)	 3,	 22.	 The	 citation	 is	 translated	from	Swedish	and	emphasis	added	by	the	author.	For	Westerlund,	‘paradigm’	seems	to	mean	 an	 attitude	 or	 viewpoint;	 a	 background	 against	 which	 legal	 problems	 are	conceptualized.	 He	 promulgates	 a	 Kuhnian	 paradigmatic	 change.	 The	 focus	 is	 on	which	kind	of	questions	should	be	asked	and	how	the	results	should	be	interpreted.	Elsewhere	 Westerlund	 refers	 to	 (eco-)sustainable	 development	 as	 ‘the	 ultimate	prerequisite’,	 Staffan	Westerlund,	 ‘Sustainable	Balancing’	 in	 	Pekka	Vihervuori,	Kari	Kuusiniemi	 and	 Jari	 Siltala	 (eds),	 Juhlajulkaisu	 Erkki	 J.	 Hollo	 1940-28/11-2000	(Lakimiesliiton	kustannus	2000).	
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biodiversity.11	Westerlund	sees	the	change	as	being	absolutely	necessary	if	the	challenges	presented	by	lack	of	sustainability	are	to	be	met.12		Here	the	concept	of	rättsekologi	is	taken	as	a	point	of	departure,	but	its	further	development	is	based	on	a	pragmatic	question:	what	would	be	the	best	means	of	
achieving	the	result?		A	practical	solution	to	the	dilemma	is	presented,	addressing	how	these	rudimentary	challenges	might	be	met	without	hampering	the	needs	of	legal	certainty	and	sound	adjudication.	On	the	principle	of	Occam’s	razor,	the	attempt	to	reach	the	goal	is	made	with	as	few	changes	to	existing	practice	as	is	possible.	Therefore,	in	what	follows,	legal	ecology	is	presented	as	one	plausible	and	appropriate	approach.		
2.2	Ecological	knowledge	in	judicial	decision-making		When	mapping	the	ground	for	legal	ecology	the	first	task	is	to	take	a	look	at	the	less	familiar	part	of	the	combination:	ecology,	the	science	of	relations	between	organisms	occuring	in	ecosystems.13	What	is	important	to	bear	in	mind	when	using	ecology	for	
																																																								
11	Staffan	Westerlund,	'Law	and	the	Biosphere,	or	the	Biosphere	and	Law?	About	the	Sustainability	Paradigm	and	Law's	Problems	with	That'	(Rätt	och	utveckling	-	Oikeus	ja	kehitys	XII,	Rättsvetenskapens	dagar,	Åbo	Academis	förlag	2010)	17,	27.	
12	ibid	26.	
13	Cf.	Carol	M.	Rose,	'Environmental	Law	Grows	Up	(More	or	Less),	and	What	Science	Can	Do	to	Help'	(2005)	9(2)	Lewis	&	Clark	Law	Review	273.	
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the	benefit	of	legal	scholarship	is	that	ecology	cannot	be	reduced	to	Newtonian	mechanics	or	to	hydrodynamics,	for	example.	The	theoretical	foundation	of	ecology	has	until	recently	been	more	empirical	than	conjectural.	This	means	that	drafting	regulations	based	on	the	results	of	ecology	is	a	much	more	complex	and	contingent	undertaking	than	implementing	the	results	of,	say,	mechanics.14	The	answers	ecology	may	give	differs	in	important	respects	from	the	answers	supplied	by	pure—i.e.	less	applied—fields	of	science.	Accordingly,	legal	scholars	should	proceed	with	caution	each	time	they	see	ecology	used	as	extrajudicial	material	for	judicial	decision-making.	Nonetheless,	ecology	is	used,	with	or	without	constraint—a	situation	demanding	further	investigation	and	analysis.			 Let	us	now	take	a	closer	look	at	a	piece	of	regulation	in	which	the	results	of	ecology	play	a	significant	role.	Before	focusing	on	practical	problems	that	have	occured,	let	us	briefly	survey	how	the	problem	can	be	handled	theoretically.	In	Lena	Wahlberg’s	analysis	of	the	problems	environmental	law	confronts	when	trying	to	draw	on	scientific	information,	she	divided	the	challenges	into	several																																																									
14		 Olli	 Malve,	 Water	 quality	 prediction	 for	 river	 basin	 management	 (Teknillinen	korkeakoulu	 2007)	 <http://lib.tkk.fi/Diss/2007/isbn9789512287505>	 accessed	 18	February	 2014,	 23−4.	 E.g.	 the	 determination,	 calibration	 and	 validation	 of	 models	used	in	ecology	is	affected	by	a	rather	large	number	of	factors.	This	is	not	the	case	in	less	applied	fields	of	science	which	do	not	aim	to	tackle	problems	like	eutrophication	or	other	water	pollution.		
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categories.15	One	of	the	most	crucial	differences	between	legal	scholars	and	scientists	is	the	conception	of	causality	they	use:	legally	relevant	relations	pertain	between	legally	relevant	causes	and	legally	relevant	effects	irrespective	of	whether	these	are	scientifically	relevant.16	This	point	is	by	no	means	a	new	one:	legally	relevant	causation	or	a	legally	relevant	standard	of	proof	has	long	been	known	to	differ	from	scientific	causation.17	The	important	point	regarding	the	use	of	ecology	as	a	tool	for	regulation	is	the	difficulty	produced	by	the	very	framing	of	the	question	in	law—and	this	can	be	seen	as	the	root	of	the	problem.	According	to	Wahlberg,	what	makes	matters	so	difficult	is	that	legal	scholars	or	lawyers	responsible	for	drafting	regulations	ask	different	questions	than	those	posed	by	the	relevant	scientists	in	the	course	of	their	studies,18	a	conceptual	and	disciplinary	gap	implying	that	the	findings	needed	might	not	even	exist	in	the	terms	in	which	they	are	sought.19	
																																																								
15		Lena	Wahlberg,	Legal	Questions	and	Scientific	Answers:	Ontological	Differences	and	
Epistemic	 Gaps	 in	 the	 Assessment	 of	 Causal	 Relations	 (Lund	 University	 2010),	 cf.	Tarlock,	'Is	There	a	There	There	in	Environmental	Law?'	(n	1)	253.	
16	Wahlberg,	Legal	Questions	and	Scientific	Answers	(n	15)	27.		
17	ibid	15,	esp.	references	in	fn	8;	also	130.	
18	Ibid	16.		
19		Interestingly,	originally	adaptive	management—the	regulative	approach	in	which	the	WFD	also	belongs—was	meant	 to	 form	an	active	 template	 from	which	not	only	managers	 but	 also	 science	 itself	 could	 learn	 lessons:	 C.	 S.	 Holling	 (ed),	 Adaptive	
Environmental	 Assessment	 and	 Management	 (Wiley,	 1978).	 Had	 the	 regulators	
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The	manner	in	which	scientific	information	could	help	in	forming	legally	relevant	causation	can	be	divided	into	two	steps.	First,	an	association	should	be	established	between	scientific	kinds	of	entity	that	are	instantiated	by	a	certain	legally	interesting	behavior	and	the	damage	in	question.20	For	example	an	action—e.g.	the	use	of	pesticides—might	have	been	taken	into	the	sphere	of	regulation	since	the	behaviour	is	generally	associated	with	harmful	effects—irrespective	of	whether	those	effects	have	taken	place	in	a	specific	case.21			Secondly,	a	legally	relevant	relation	should	be	established	between	instances	of	these	scientific	kinds.22	In	this	case,	particular	behaviour	and	particular	damage	are	placed	under	scrutiny.23	Bearing	in	mind	that	several	actions	and	forms	of	damage	that	may	be	of	interest	to	legal	scholars	remain	rather	uninspiring	for	scientists,	achieving	the	first	step	is	not	necessarily	as	straightforward	as	it	sounds.	The	phrase	‘scientific	kinds	of	
																																																																																																																																																																							succeeded	 in	 that,	 this	 specific	 problem	 might	 have	 been	 solved.	 Unfortunately	adaptive	 management	 is	 nowadays	 mostly	 utilised	 in	 its	 ‘passive’	 form,	 not	 that	focused	 on	 enhancing	 also	 the	 science	 upon	 which	 it	 relies:	 Cameron	 Holley	 and	Darren	 Sinclair,	 'Collaborative	 Governance	 and	 Adaptive	 Management:	(Mis)applications	 to	 Groundwater,	 Salinity	 and	 Run-Off'	 (2011)	 14(1)	 The	Australasian	Journal	of	Natural	Resources	Law	and	Policy	37.	
20	Wahlberg,	Legal	Questions	and	Scientific	Answers	(n	15)	157.		
21	Ibid	69–70.	
22	Ibid	157.	
23	Ibid	167ff.	
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entity’	poses	another	challenge:	the	way	behavior	is	isolated	and	defined	in	scientific	research	does	not	automatically	equate	with	the	behaviors	of	interest	to	draftsmen,	practicing	lawyers	or	legal	scholars.			
2.3	Ecological	Knowledge	in	the	WFD—When	the	Normative	and	the	Factual	
Mingle	As	noted	above,	in	its	generally	accepted	definition,	ecology	is	an	interdisciplinary	branch	of	biology	studying	the	relations	between	natural	organisms	and	the	relations	between	them	and	their	natural	environment.	Ecology	brings	us,	therefore,	quite	naturally	to	considerations	of	‘ecological	sustainability’—if	the	lack	of	eco-sustainability	that	plagues	environmental	law	is	to	be	solved,	how	do	we	specify	what	we	actually	mean	by	the	term	‘ecological	sustainability’?		A	practical	example	will	serve	to	illustrate	the	problem	deriving	from	ecology	as	a	field	of	science.	The	recently	widely	examined	European	Water	Framework	Directive	(WFD24)	is	a	useful	heuristic	device,	since	the	WFD	draws	in	particular	upon	ecological	knowledge.	In	the	WFD	generally	the	aim	is	that	all	water	bodies	should	attain	good	ecological	status.	This	environmental	object	is	somewhat	exhaustively	defined	in	the	directive,	especially	in	its	annexes.25	
																																																								
24	Directive	2000/60/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	23	October	2000	establishing	a	framework	for	community	action	in	the	field	of	water	policy.	
25	The	environmental	objectives	of	the	WFD	are	written	down	in	Article	4	while	the	various	statuses,	including	the	ecological,	are	defined	in	Article	2.	
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	 	As	a	directive	the	WFD	has	not	gone	without	challenge:	feedback	has	been	given	on	the	directive	from	the	EU	member	states	and	from	environmental	law	scholars	for	a	variety	of	reasons.		One	particularly	relevant	criticism	is	that	made	by	Josefsson	and	Baaner.26	According	to	them,	the	WFD	does	not	make	the	best	use	of	ecological	or	of	biological	knowledge.	The	ecological	status	of	a	water	body	is	defined	with	biological	‘quality	elements’,	which	are	classified	by	scientists	at	the	EU	level	and	in	the	Member	States.	‘Quality	elements’	are	items	of	fauna	or	flora	either	found	or	not	found	in	the	water	body.27	The	point	of	the	criticism	is	that,	when	gauging	the	‘good	ecological	status’	of	waters,	these	are	secondary	features.	‘Good	ecological	status’	is	more	about	structures	and	processes	of	aquatic	ecosystems,	rather	than	the	presence	or	absence	of	single	elements.	The	chosen	path	has	led	to	an	‘one	out,	all	out’	system	which	does	not	give	the	desired	results.28	Our	example	seems	at	least	to	indicate	that	scientific	knowledge	is	not	always	used	in	the	best	possible	way	in	legislative	contexts—a	matter	we	shall	return	to.29	Despite	this,	it	is	common	that	the	results	of	(social)	sciences	are	used	in	law	in	order	to	provide	important	regulation.		
																																																								
26	Henrik	Josefsson	and	Lasse	Baaner,	'The	Water	Framework	Directive—A	Directive	for	the	Twenty-First	Century?'	(2011)	23(3)	Journal	of	Environmental	Law	463.	
27		Ibid	470.	
28		Ibid	471,	473.		
29	Text	at	n	37ff	and	43ff.	See	also	fn	19	on	how	adaptive	management	was	originally	perceived.	
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In	the	case	of	the	WFD,	however,	ecology	seems	to	have	a	different	role.	It	seems	that	more	nuanced,	normative	and	factual	elements	have	become	commingled.	When	its	analyses	and	results	are	used	for	establishing	the	norm—i.e.	for	determining	which	water	bodies	reach	and	which	do	not	reach	‘good	ecological	status’—ecological	knowledge	has	passed	the	point	of	being	just	a	regulatory	tool.			 The	change	wrought	by	the	WFD	is	particularly	salient	in	the	context	of	the	civil	law	system	(which	is	the	main	focus	of	the	present	analysis).	In	the	civil	law	system,	the	understanding	of	judicial	decision-making	has	long	been	about	facts	and	norms:	sein	and	sollen,	is	and	ought,	as	distinct	domains.		Adjudication	has	been	understood	to	act	like	a	logical	syllogism—	a	nearly	automatic	pattern	in	which	the	factual	and	normative	follow	each	other	until	a	conclusion	is	reached—even	though	that	understanding	has	been	criticised	in	much	of	the	literature.	30	The	criticism	has	concurrently	stimulated	a	quest	for	a	more	nuanced	perception	of	judicial	decision-making.	Legal	theorists	have—in	this	process—	noted	the	insufficiency	of	the	realms	
																																																								
30		Aulis	Aarnio,	The	Rational	as	Reasonable:	A	Treatise	on	Legal	Justification	(Reidel,	Dordrecht	cop.	1987),	120-1;	Eveline	T.	Feteris,	'Dialogical	theory	of	legal	discussions:	Pragma-dialectical	 analysis	 and	 evaluation	 of	 legal	 argumentation'	 (2000)	 8(2)	Artificial	 Intelligence	 and	 Law	 115,	 122;	 Douglas	 Fisher,	 Legal	 Reasoning	 in	
Environmental	 Law:	 A	 Study	 of	 Structure,	 Form	 and	 Language	 (Edward	 Elgar	Publishing	Ltd.	2013)	480,	13.	All	 start	by	describing	 the	syllogism	and	continue	 to	criticise	 it	 by	 analysing	 either	 other	 logical	 processes	 or	 argumentation	 models	commonly	employed	in	adjudication.	
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of	logic	and	proceeded	to	considerations	of	material	acceptability:	the	rhetorical	approach	also	takes	the	context	into	account—the	dialogical	approach	goes	even	further	by	accepting	arguments	relevant	to	those	participating	in	the	discussion.31	Whereas	the	strict	logical	syllogism	expresses	internal	justification,	the	latter	two	approaches	are	examples	of	external	justification.32	Still,	all	the	various	ways	of	trying	to	grasp	the	problem	have	glossed	over	the	meaning	of	the	concepts	of	norms	and	facts	while	trying	to	explain	how	they	interact—and	in	a	rather	persistent	manner,	trying	to	assure	the	reader	that	at	the	end	of	the	day	norms	are	superior	to	facts:	what	is	normative	is	defined	by	the	norms;	facts	are	only	used	in	the	process,	as	grist	to	the	mill.	The	types	of	facts	relevant	to	legal	decision-making	can	be	analysed	and	divided,	but	even	then	facts	are	conceived	of	as	something	law	refers	to—at	the	most,	the	‘facts	referred	to	in	law	have	certain	characteristics	imposed	by	law’.33	The	scientist	might	be	of	great	utility	to	the	decision-maker,	but	still	the	roles	of	fact	provider	and	decision	maker	remain	distinct.34		
																																																								
31	Fisher	Legal	Reasoning	in	Environmental	Law	(n	30)	16-7.	
32	Aarnio,	 The	 Rational	 as	 Reasonable	 (n	 30)	 189-92;	 Fisher	 Legal	 Reasoning	 in	
Environmental	Law	(n	30)	17.	
33	Jerzy	Wróblewski,	Meaning	and	truth	in	judicial	decision	(Juridica	1979)	132.	
34	Ibid	 Wróblewski,	Meaning	 and	 truth	 in	 judicial	 decision	 113;	 Hans	 Kelsen,	 Reine	
Rechtslehre:	Einleitung	in	die	rechtswissenschaftliche	Problematik	 (Reprint	of	1st	edn	Leipzig	and	Vienna	1934,	Scientia	1985)	35,	37-8.		
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	 However,	when	the	WFD	is	brought	into	this	conversation	it	appears	that	something	might	have	changed.	A	Finnish	study	of	the	‘good	ecological	status’	of	surface	waters	included	interviews	with	the	officials	who	classify	the	status	and	evaluate	the	waters	as	mandated	by	the	WFD.	According	to	the	study,	these	officials	had	a	very	clear	understanding	that	what	they	did	was	by	its	very	nature	normative.35	Bearing	in	mind	that	the	officials	are	not	lawyers	but	scientists,	this	internalised	understanding	of	theirs	does	not	comply	with	the	dominant	theoretical	understanding	of	judicial	decision-making—nor	of	the	dominant	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	facts	and	norms.		 It	seems	that	with	the	WFD	the	factual	and	the	normative	have	become	commingled	in	a	novel	manner.	Whether	the	environmental	objective	of	‘good	ecological	status’	is	a	technical	provision	or	a	legal	norm36,	the	way	in	which																																																									
35		Jussi	Kauppila,	'Pintaveden	normatiivinen	tila'	(2000)	<http://www.edilex.fi/lakikirjasto/8600.pdf;>	accessed	18	April	2014.	According	to	Kauppila	there	are	at	least	three	categories	of	officials	relevant	in	the	classifying	process:	officials	representing	the	regional	authorities,	officials	from	central	administration	and	scientists	developing	the	classificatory	mechanism	in	general.	ibid	37,	fn	147.		
36 	Andrea	 M.	 Keessen	 and	 others,	 'European	 River	 Basin	 Districts:	 Are	 They	Swimming	in	the	Same	Implementation	Pool?'	(2010)	22(2)	Journal	of	Environmental	Law	197.	To	answer	this	question	−	whether	environmental	objects	 in	the	WFD	are	obligations	 of	 result	 or	 obligations	 of	 best	 effort	−	 is	 simultaneously	 to	 answer	 the	
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ecological	information	is	used	in	the	directive	differs	from	what	we	have	witnessed	hitherto.	In	the	WFD,	scientific	information	is	not	merely	used	as	a	tool	to	define	which	norms	should	apply	or	how	those	norms	should	apply.	Instead	of	using	the	‘non-legal	information’	in	a	traditional	way,	the	normative	in	the	WFD	is	formed	while	
the	necessary	scientific	information	is	gathered.	This	is	what	has	changed	with	the	WFD:	the	normative	and	the	factual	no	longer	merely	interact,	they	have	become	commingled.	Scientific	information	provided	by	the	experts	is	no	longer	used	for	the	judicial	decision	but	rather	the	judicial	decision	is	made	in	effect	before	the	factual	is	brought	to	bear	on	the	normative	for	interpretation.37	This	is	because	the	status	analyses	leave	little	if	no	room	for	the	permit-granting	authorities	in	their	work:	the	quality	of	waters	or	the	status	of	a	waterbody	must	not	be	deteriorated.	The	worst	case	scenario	is	that	if	the	status	of	one	quality	element	among	others	deteriorates	from	‘good’	to	‘poor’,	additional	emissions	to	the	concerned	waterbody	should	be	
																																																																																																																																																																							question	whether	the	WFD	in	general	has	any	normative	weight	or	not.	Opinion	of	AG	Jääskinen	 in	 Case	 C-461/13	 (ECLI:EU:C:2014:2324,	 23.10.2014)	 elucidates	 the	dilemma,	see	text	at	fn	(40).	
37	Regarding	Finland,	it	seems	that	the	Supreme	Administrative	Court	in	Finland	has	approved	 this	 mingling:	 When	 the	 Court	 in	 its	 reasoning	 refers	 to	 the	 water	management	plans	 it	proceeds	without	trying	to	separate	the	factual	elements	from	the	normative	ones:	 Jussi	Kauppila.	 'Vesienhoitosuunnitelma	 ja	 lupaharkinta.	Osa	1:	Lähtökohtia	 vedenlaatunormin	muodostumiselle'	 (2014)	 35(1)	 Ympäristöjuridiikka	47,	60,	51.	
©	[Tiina	Paloniitty,	2015].	The	definitive,	peer	reviewed	and	edited	version	of	this	article	is	
published	in	Journal	of	Human	Rights	and	the	Environment,	Vol.	6	No.	1,	pp.	55–74,	March	2015,	
and	can	be	found	online	at	http://www.elgaronline.com/abstract/journals/jhre/6-
1/jhre.2015.01.03.xml		
	 18	
prohibited—meaning	that	no	undertaking	posing	that	risk	could	be	allowed.	Hence	discretion	concerning	whether	to	allow	a	novel	enterprise	is	conducted	at	the	management	planning	level	by	scientists—long	before	permissions	are	either	applied	or	reasoned	about	by	officials.38	What	makes	our	example	less	clear	is	that,	in	the	application	of	the	WFD,	the	decisions	made	are	not	in	every	respect	judicial	decisions.	Judicial	decisions	are	commonly	defined	as	decisions	in	individual	cases,	where	general	norms	are	applied	in	a	particular	situation.39	When	‘good	ecological	status’	is	classified,	or	waters	are	evaluated,	the	activity	in	question	is	not	about	solving	an	individual	case.	However,	this	does	not	mean	that	the	evaluation	of	water	bodies	in	particular	could	never	have	effects	similar	to	solving	a	case.	This	is	especially	so	if	the	ECJ	ends	up	confirming	the	opinion	of	AG	Jääskinen	on	how	to	interpret	the	concept	‘deterioration	of	the	quality	status’.	According	to	AG	Jääskinen,	the	prohibition	of	deterioration	binds	the	Member	States	in	the	permitting	procedures	of	individual	undertakings	and	that	deterioration	
																																																								
38	The	 European	 Court	 of	 Justice	 is	 just	 about	 to	 take	 a	 stance	 on	 how	 the	 Article	4(1)(a)(i)	of	 the	WFD	should	accurately	be	 interpreted	 in	 this	 respect:	whether	 the	prohibition	of	deterioration	is	directed	at	the	status	of	the	waterbody	in	general,	the	status	 of	 one	 quality	 element	 among	 others—or	whether	 quality	 statuses	 are	 only	statements	 of	 an	 objective	 for	management	 planning	 (in	 programmes	 of	measures	compiled	according	 to	Art.	11	of	 the	WFD):	See	 request	 for	a	preliminary	 ruling	by	Bund	für	Umwelt	und	Naturschutz	Deutschland,	C-461/13.		
39	Aarnio,	The	Rational	as	Reasonable	(n	30)	62.	
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of	one	status	element	is	enough—even	irrespective	of	whether	that	deterioration	would	affect	the	classification	of	the	water	body.40		
	
2.4	Legal	ecology:	putting	decision-making	back	into	judicial	decision-making		Where	does	all	this	lead	us?	Study	of	the	WFD	reveals	that	as	a	tool	for	judicial	decision-making	ecological	knowledge	does	not	provide	an	easy	match.	The	root	of	the	problem	may	lie	either	in	the	way	ecology	as	a	field	of	science	is	currently	practised	or	in	the	misinterpreted	manner	in	which	it	has	been	put	to	use	in	the	WFD.41	For	the	purposes	of	this	article,	however,	the	WFD	provides	an	opportunity	to	learn	a	number	of	good	lessons.	The		example	of	the	WFD	shows	that	scientific	knowledge	is	currently	used	in	a	way	which	does	not	fit	so	well	into	the	theoretical	frameworks	of	civil	law	judicial	decision-making.	The	attempt	in	the	WFD—managing	water	quality	in	the	Member	States	with	the	help	of	vast	amount	of	facts	and	leaving	the	norms	themselves	rather	
																																																								
40	The	Opinion	of	AG	Jääskinen	in	Case	C-461/13	(ECLI:	EU:C:2014:2324,	23.10.2014),	at	[84]	and	at	[109].	See	also	Case	C-43/10	Nomarchiaki	Aftodioikisi	
Aitoloakarnanias	and	Others	(EU:C:2011:651),	Opinion	of	AG	Kokott	in	which	AG	Kokott	stated	that	Article	4	may	under	certain	conditions	concern	also	specific	projects,	at	[62].	
41	Josefsson	&	Baaner,	‘The	Water	Framework	Directive—A	Directive	for	the	Twenty-First	Century'	(n	26)	471,	473.	
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flexible—has	not	been	completely	successful.	What	the	WFD	and	studies	on	using	ecological	knowledge	in	the	field	of	law	teach	us	is	that	if	we	in	effect	outsource	judicial	decision-making	from	individual	permitting	processes	to	the	management	planning	stage—including	purely	scientific	analysis—then	that	poses	a	real	risk	whose	consequences	are	not	to	be	underestimated.42	How	then	might	these	decisively	important	problems	be	solved?	Could	the	fuzzy	divide	between	facts	and	norms	be	dissolved	in	a	controlled	manner	in	order	better	to	meet	the	challenges	of	the	current	situation,	identified	in	legal	and	legislative	practice,	and	challenging	the	settled	assumptions	of	much	environmental	law	scholarship?	To	answer	these	questions	we	first	need	to	realise	that	the	WFD	example	reveals	that	what	has	traditionally	been	seen	as	the	work	of	legal	experts	has	swung	in	favor	of	the	scientists,	in	so	far	as	ecology	is	a	field	of	science.	The	end	result	is	that	the	normative	is	predetermined	by	the	scientists,	leaving	the	lawyers	and	judges	with	immutable	boundaries.	This	is	not	due	to	the	wording	of	the	WFD	but	because	the	operative	priority—in	effect—granted	to	management	planning	leaves	little—or	no—room	for	the	relevant	permission-granting	authority	to	form	an	opinion	of	its	own.		We	also	need	to	realise	that	the	normative	part	of	the	evaluation	conducted	according	to	the	WFD	is	actually	nothing	new.	When	scientists	evaluate	data	and	
																																																								
42	See	text	at	fn	(40)	on	the	Case	C-461/13.	If	the	ECJ	rules	the	case	according	to	the	Opinion	of	AG	Jääskinen,	then	the	classification	conducted	by	a	group	of	scientists	will	in	effect	have	decided	future	procedures	before	they	were	even	presented.	
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classify	the	quality	of	a	water	body	according	to	an	evaluation	prescribed	by	the	WFD,	in	addition	to	the	scientific	work	involved,	scientists	do	indeed	evaluate	water	quality	in	a	normative	sense.43	Traditionally,	the	interpretation	of	raw	data	has	been	the	work	of	legal	experts	and	ultimately	this	has	meant	giving	expression	to	a	value-based	
assessment	because	some	values	are	deemed	important	enough	to	be	protected	by	a	legal	system,	others	not.	This	is	why	the	implementation	of	the	WFD	presents	such	a	challenge	for	law:	what	has	previously	been	done	and	what	could	be	done	within	law	is	now	done	within	the	field	of	ecology.	The	solution	proposed	here	for	this	dilemma	is	to	bring	the	normative	decision-making	back	within	the	judicial	realm	by	applying	the	results	of	theoretical	studies	which	take	account	of	values.	Acccordingly,		a	key	to	solving	the	problem	is	realising	that	the	problem	lies	not	in	ecological	knowledge	or	in	the	structure	of	the	WFD	but	in	the	fact	that	the	value-based	decisions	required	when	using	ecological	
knowledge	could	also	be	made	within	the	field	of	law.	Outsourcing	normative	decisions,	as	it	were,	to	the	scientists	is	not	the	only	option.	There	is	a	case	for	expanding	the	zone	of	focus	by	turning	to	the	objectives	or	values	motivating	environmental	regulation.	
	
2.5	Compatibility	with	other	more	or	less	critical	studies		
																																																								
43	This	was	 the	point	noted	 in	 the	above-mentioned	 study	by	Kauppila,	 ‘Pintaveden	normatiivinen	tila’—see	text	relating	to	n	35.	
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Having	seen	how	ecology	as	a	field	of	science	sets	challenges	for	environmental	law	scholarship	and	traditional	understandings	of	judicial	decision-making,	let	us	take	a	closer	look	at	legal	ecology	as	a	methodological	approach.	Here	legal	ecology	is	compared	with	law	and	economics—the	other	method	of	law	that	openly	expresses	its	dependence	on	a	non-legal	field	of	science.	The	aim	of	this	exercise	is	to	clarify	what	legal	ecology	means	as	a	methodological	choice.44		 Even	though	law	and	economics	is	relatively	mainstream	in	common	law	countries,	especially	in	North	America,	it	has	also	been	used	elsewhere.	Briefly	stated,	in	law	and	economics,	law’s	economic	effects	are	taken	into	consideration	in	the	interpretation	of	the	law—this	is	why	it	can	lay	claim	to	being	called	a	pragmatic	approach	to	law.45		In	law	and	economics,	legal	systems	are	studied	like	any	other	system	subjected	to	economic	analysis:	the	legal	system	is	seen	as	a	network	where	legal	
																																																								
44	Another	baseline	could	be	different	critical	approaches	to	law:	critical	legal	studies	(CLS),	critical	legal	positivism—or	more	specific	critical	studies,	feminist	legal	theory	and	so	forth.	What	unites	these	is	their	relation	with	legal	positivism:	to	some	extent	legal	 positivism	 does	 not	 answer	 the	 questions	 that	 are	 brought	 up	 in	 the	 reality	referred	to.		
45		Raimo	Siltala,	Law,	Truth	and	Reason:	a	Treatise	on	Legal	Argumentation	(Springer	2011)	109–112.	
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certainty,	court	rulings	and	other	legal	procedures	form	a	market.46	This	market	is	studied	with	the	help	of	economics.	Just	how	teleological	this	basis	for	study	is	or	what	its	aims	are	is	not	postulated	as	a	starting	point,		though	as	a	result	of	applying	law	and	economics,	economic	efficiency	invariably	becomes	the	decisive	factor	in	judicial	decision-making.47		 What	both	legal	ecology	and	law	and	economics	have	in	common	is	the	pragmatist’s	view	on	legal	studies:	the	effectiveness	or	usefulness	of	law	is	paramount,	metaphysical	aspirations	are	put	to	one	side.48	Further	analogies	from	
																																																								
46		 Richard	 A.	 Posner,	 Economic	 Analysis	 of	 Law	 (Volume	 3.	 ed,	 Little,	 Brown	 &	Company	1986),	20–22.	
47	Siltala,	 Law,	 Truth	 and	 Reason	 (n	 45)	 109-12,	 in	 which	 Siltala	 is	 rather	 critical	towards	 the	postulates	 chosen	 in	 law	and	economics.	 Siltala’s	 critique	concerns	 the	lack	of	 institutional	support	provided	to	those	 facing	the	economic	consequences	of	law:	ibid	112.	Like	Dworkin,	Siltala	asks	why	economic	efficiency	in	particular	should	be	 given	 priority	 in	 legal	 interpretation:	 see	 Ronald	 Dworkin,	A	Matter	of	Principle		(Harvard	 University	 Press	 1985)	 266ff.	 Also	 e.g.	 S.	 A.	 Shapiro	 and	 C.	 H.	 Schroeder,	'Beyond	 cost-benefit	 analysis:	 A	 pragmatic	 reorientation'	 (2008)	 32	 Harvard	Environmental	 Law	 Review	 433,	 439–40.	 and	 Douglas	 A.	 Kysar,	 Regulating	 from	
nowhere:	 	 environmental	 law	 and	 the	 search	 for	 objectivity	 (Yale	 University	 Press	2010)	have	provided	further	critique,	especially	on	the	usage	of	cost-benefit	analysis	in	environmental	policy-making.	
48	Siltala,	Law,	Truth	and	Reason	(n	45)	98.	
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law	and	economics	to	legal	ecology	do	not	appear	feasible	however.	Legal	order	is	not	a	workable	object	for	ecological	research—legal	order	does	not	form	an	ecological	system	for	study.	In	legal	ecology,	the	results	of	ecology	are	applied	or—as	discussed	above—judicial	decision-making	occurs	when/where	the	results	of	ecological	investigation	are	gathered.	As	a	gross	simplification	it	might	be	said	that	some	end	results	of	legal	actions	are	seen	as	more	desirable	than	others	and	that	this	is	more	openly	expressed	in	legal	ecology	than	a	comparable	result	might	be	in	law	and	economics.49		Accordingly,	legal	ecology	is	drawn	further	away	from	law	and	economics	and	closer	to	critical	studies	of	law:	critical	legal	studies	(CLS),	feminist	legal	theory	and	so	forth.50	Critical	studies	share	the	(howsoever	constituted)	outsider’s	view	on	the	current	hegemonic	view	amongst	legal	scholars—whatever	that	current	hegemony	might	be—and	aim	to	unveil	the	consequences	for	the	legal	system	of	the	status	quo.51	The	willingness	to	unveil	consequences	is	what	unifies	legal	ecology	with	critical	approaches	and	distances	it	from	law	and	economics:	the	critical	approaches	and	legal	ecology	openly	favor	certain	consequences,	while	law	and	economics—by	
																																																								
49	For	how	this	is	done	in	legal	ecology,	see	text	at	n	72ff.	
50	On	 the	 variety	 of	 approaches	 see	 	 Deborah	 Z.	 Cass,	 'Navigating	 the	 Newstream:	Recent	 Critical	 Scholarship	 in	 International	 Law'	 in	 Nordic	 Journal	 of	 International	Law	(1996)	341.	
51		 Jarna	Petman,	 'Human	Rights	and	Violence:	The	Hope	and	the	Fear	of	the	Liberal	World'	in	(University	of	Helsinki	2012),	5.	
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applying	the	standard	methods	of	economics	to	the	legal	system—focuses	on	the	system	itself	and	lays	claim	to	lack	of	bias	concerning	outcomes.		However,	a	critical	approach	is	not	a	methodological	approach	as	such.	It	does	not	answer	the	question	of	how	studies	on	law	should	be	conducted	or	legal	decisions	made.	Notwithstanding	this	key	distinction	between	critical	approaches	and	legal	ecology,	legal	ecology	can	be	described	as	a	critical	approach	to	law.	We	shall	return	to	the	matter	of	how	this	characterisation	of	legal	ecology	affects	its	deployment	and	how	it	is	institutionalised	below.52		3	TAKING	AIMS	SERIOUSLY		Even	if	the	way	in	which	ecological	knowledge	is	currently	used	in	regulation	were	rather	flawed,	the	challenges	would	remain	the	same.	It	could	be	said	that	the	aim	of	the	environmental	regulation—reducing	pollution,	enhancing	water	quality	and	so	forth—is	evident	even	though	the	means	to	the	end	have	been	of	dubious	merit.	If	the	aims	are	clear	but	their	fulfillment	is	lacking,	what	might	be	done?	Might	there	be	better	measures	available?	Answering	these	questions	brings	us	to	the	core	concern	of	legal	ecology	as	a	methodology:	how	might	the	lack	of	eco-sustainability	be	incorporated	into	the	legal	argumentation?	What	would	to	the	implications	be	for	environmental	judicial	decision-making?	The	answers	might	not	be	that	far	away	after	all.	
																																																								
52	On	choosing	the	end	result	and	how	it	responds	to	teleology,	see	text	at	n	57ff.	
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3.1	Ready!	—the	aim-setting	sections	as	filters			It	is	common	that	in	legal	texts	in	the	field	of	environmental	law	the	relevant	piece	of	legislation	starts	by	setting	the	aim.	This	has	been	a	growing	tendency	in	recent	years:	most	new	environmental	statutes	start	with	a	paragraph	setting	out	the	aim	of	the	legislative	action.53	The	difference	between	these	aims	and	the	aims	of	a	
																																																								
53	For	Finnish	examples,	see	Environmental	Protection	Act	(2000/86)	Chapter	1,	Section	1	<http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2000/en20000086.pdf>,	Nature	Conservation	Act	(1996/1096),	Chapter	1,	Section	1	<http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1996/en19961096.pdf>	or	Waste	Act	(646/2011)	Chapter	1	Section	1	(translation	is	available	only	for	the	previous	Act	(1072/1993)	but	the	aim-setting	sections	are	essentially	the	same	<http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1993/en19931072.pdf>.	The	same	applies	for	the	Environmental	Protection	Act:	it	was	repealed	with	replacement	in	2014	(527/2014,	http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/2014/20140527),	the	translation	is	not	yet	available	but	the	aim-setting	sections	have	not	essentially	changed.	A	similar	legislative	tradition	is	to	be	found	in	other	civil	law	countries,	see	for	example	the	Swedish	Environmental	Code	(1998:808)	Part	1,	Chapter	1,	Section	1	<http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/02/28/47/385ef12a.pdf>	or	South	African	National	Environment	Management:	Air	Quality	Act	39	Of	2004,	Chapter	1,	Section	2	
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directive—or	a	framework	directive—is	crucial	in	the	sense	that	when	included	in	the	text	of	a	statute	the	aim	should	be	given	higher	normative	status	than	should	the	preamble	to	a	directive.	These	sections	are	referred	to	here	as	the	aim-setting	
sections.		 Despite	their	importance,	these	aim-setting	sections	are	more	or	less	neglected:	a	good	example	of	which	is	the	practice	in	Finland.	In	Finland,	the	aim-setting	sections	have	been	part	of	environmental	legislation	for	as	long	as	it	has	existed	as	a	separate	field.	Owing	to	their	complexity,	such	sections	have	been	nicknamed	‘birdsong	sections’—birdsong	referring	on	the	one	hand	to	all	that	is	virtuous	and	beautifully	written	in	the	sections	and	on	the	other	to	their	unbearable	normative	lightness.54	The	nickname	as	such	reveals	enough	about	the	difficulties	such	sections	have	caused.	In	the	civil	law	context,	the	text	of	the	statute	has	considerable	significance	when	defining	the	norm	the	legislator	has	sought	to	lay	
																																																																																																																																																																							<http://www.capetown.gov.za/en/EnvironmentalResourceManagement/publications/Documents/NEM_AirQualityMngtAct.pdf>.	All	accessed	18	February	2014.		
54	Linnunlaulupykälät	or	’birdsong	sections’	as	a	part	of	jargon	of	environmental	law	practitioners	 was	 first	 mentioned	 in	 the	 literature	 in	 1998,	 Tapio	 Määttä	‘Lainsäätäjän	 kunnioittamisasenne,	 tavoitteellinen	 laintulkinta	 ja	 lakien	tavoitesäännökset	 vallitsevassa	 tuomarinideologiassa’	 in	 Auri	 Pakarinen,	 Anna	Hyvärinen	and	Kaijus	Ervasti	(eds),	Lainvalmistelu,	tutkimus,	yhteiskunta:	Jyrki	Talan	
juhlakirja	(Turun	 yliopiston	 oikeustieteellisen	 tiedekunnan	 julkaisuja	 n:o	 23,	 Turun	yliopisto	2011)	215.	
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down,	but	when	the	text	is	descriptive,	setting	high	aims	promising	practically	everything,	the	individual	faced	with	interpreting	such	a	plethora	of	detail	might	be	excused	for	their	state	of	confusion.55		 Another	reason	for	the	confusion	is	that	in	the	aim-setting	sections	the	values	motivating	them	are	written	openly:	they	do	not	look	like	other	subsequent	sections—they	even	have	that	slightly	off-putting	(for	positivist	judicial	interpreters)	resemblance	to	natural	law.	This	sense	of	dissonance	is	understandable,	but	ultimately	based	upon	a	repression	of	the	extra-legal	dimensions	of	positivism	itself.	The	conflict	between	positivism	and	natural	law	is	well	established,	and	as	Bosselmann	has	put	it,	the	rivalry	between	the	two	has	not	been	a	fruitful	one,	yet	positivism	is	as	deeply	rooted	in	morality	as	natural	law	ever	was	and	morality	cannot	be	outsourced	from	any	form	of	legal	order.56	In	other	words,	it	can	be	argued	
																																																								
55	For	example,	see	the	repealed	Finnish	EPA	1	§	(n	46):		’The	objective	of	this	Act	is:	1)	 to	 prevent	 the	 pollution	 of	 the	 environment	 and	 to	 repair	 and	 reduce	 damage	caused	by	pollution;	2)	to	safeguard	a	healthy,	pleasant	and	ecologically	diverse	and	sustainable	 environment;	 3)	 to	 prevent	 the	 generation	 and	 the	 harmful	 effects	 of	waste;	4)	to	improve	and	integrate	assessment	of	the	impact	of	activities	that	pollute	the	 environment;	 5)	 to	 improve	 citizens'	 opportunities	 to	 influence	 decisions	concerning	the	environment;	6)	to	promote	sustainable	use	of	natural	resources;	and	7)	to	combat	climate	change	and	otherwise	support	sustainable	development’.	
56	Klaus	Bosselmann	’Grounding	the	Rule	of	Law’	(Rule	of	Law	for	Nature,	Oslo,	May	2012)	14,	 18.	 In	his	 paper	Bosselmann	also	 lists	 the	myths	 included	 in	 the	 current	
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that	for	the	positivist	the	extra-legal	element	of	law	is	the	positivism	of	law	itself—however	much	they	would	seek	to	deny	the	charge.	Accordingly,	teleological	aims	need	not	amount	to	an	inherent	problem	within	a	positivist	tradition	of	judicial	interpretation.		 According	to	Määttä,	the	Supreme	Administrative	Court	of	Finland	(SAC),	when	dealing	with	the	aim-setting	sections,	uses	teleological	arguments	in	various	ways.57	Most	commonly,	the	SAC	does	not	refer	to	the	aim-setting	sections	at	all.	Nonetheless,	there	are	cases	in	which	the	SAC	has	referred	to	the	sections,	and	in	some	cases	the	sections	have	even	held	the	balance	of	power	in	the	argumentation	as	a	whole.	Of	all	the	environmental	cases	the	SAC	decides	annually	these	few	form	a	tiny	fraction,	but	in	relation	to	the	argument	for	giving	insufficient	eco-sustainability	more	influence	in	judicial	decision	making,	this	fraction	is	significant.58	This	is	
																																																																																																																																																																							legal	order	calling	 itself	positivist.	Unveiling	 the	myths—for	example	 the	one	of	 the	invisible	 hand,	 or	 of	 unlimited	 resources	 or	 of	 rational	 behaviour—highlights	 how	positivism	cannot	escape	moral	choices.	Ibid	19−20.	
57	Here	‘teleological	argumentation’	is	used	to	mean	different	forms	of	argumentation	focusing	on	the	aims	of	the	legislator,	the	final	outcome	of	the	decision	and	so	forth.	
58 	As	 examples	 of	 cases	 meant	 here,	 see	 KHO	 2010:6	<http://www.kho.fi/paatokset/49797.htm>	 accessed	 18	 February	 2014	 or	KHO	2008:66	 <http://www.kho.fi/paatokset/44312.htm>	 accessed	 18	 February	2014.	
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because	the	cases	show	that	using	the	aim-setting	sections	in	judicial	decision-making	is	possible.	It	just	happens	not	to	be	common.		 The	way	the	SAC	has	used	the	aim-setting	sections	is	familiar	from	teleological	argumentation.59	If	the	norms	themselves	do	not	offer	a	clear	solution,	the	aim-setting	sections	are	used	to	balance	between	the	norms.	The	legal	ecology	viewpoint	takes	this	technique	and	presents	the	possibility	of	its	extension:	if	aim-setting	sections	can	be	used	to	solve	the	hard	cases,	could	this	practise	be	extended	to	cover	cases	where	ecological	knowledge	is	at	issue?	This	is	a	question	to	which	we	will	return.		
3.2	Steady!	—aims	as	principles		
																																																								
59 	One	 conclusion	 of	 Määttä’s	 article	 was	 to	 form	 an	 anatomy	 of	 teleological	argumentation.	 In	 that	 (1)	 the	 aim-setting	 sections	 were	 the	 first	 ’source’	 when	forming	 teleological	 arguments,	 the	 others	 being	 (2)	 the	 material	 provided	 by	 the	legislator	while	preparing	 the	regulation,	 (3)	arguments	drafted	 from	the	system	 in	which	 the	 statute	 belongs,	 (4)	 teleological	 argumentation	 in	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	political	 aims	 of	 the	 regulation	 and,	 as	 the	 last	 and	 least	 significant	 option,	 (5)	argumentation	focusing	on	the	consequences	of	the	decision.	The	anatomy	is	to	some	extent	hierarchical,	with	 the	most	approved	sources	 for	decision-makers	at	 the	 top.	See	 Määttä	 ‘Lainsäätäjän	 kunnioittamisasenne,	 tavoitteellinen	 laintulkinta	 ja	 lakien	tavoitesäännökset	vallitsevassa	tuomarinideologiassa’	(n	54)	219.	
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When	thinking	of	the	normative	balancing	of	principles,	the	first	scholar	to	come	to	mind	is	to	the	late	Ronald	Dworkin	and	particularly	his	writings	on	rights.	For	Dworkin,	rights	are	something	individuals	have	as	a	protection	from	the	state’s	intrusive	actions:	maximal	fulfillment	of	rights	is	the	means	by	which	an	individual	survives	under	the	governance	of	the	coercive	state	actor.60	Needless	to	say,	Dworkin	has	studied	the	issue	of	rights	in	the	American	context	of	liberal	democracy—but	his	theoretical	approach	and	jurisprudential	insights	are	still	useful	for	a	reflection	upon	the	broader	questions	of	balancing.	Indeed,	in	response	to	the	confusing	diversity	of	environmental	legal	norms,	recourse	to	Dworkin’s	theory	is	nothing	new:	within	international	environmental	law,	modifications	of	Dworkin’s	theory	have	been	numerous.	Worth	mentioning	here	are	the	approaches	presented	by	Ebbesson,	Verschuuren,	de	Sadeleer	and	Beyerlin,	who	all	wrestle	with	the	problem	of	principles	and	normativity.		Verschuuren	holds	that	no	firm	line	between	rules	and	principles	can	be	drawn.	They	both	range	from	abstract	to	concrete;	principles	form	a	link	between	moral	objectives	such	as	the	lack	of	eco-sustainability	and	normatively	binding	rules.61	De	Sadeleer	has	developed	an	intermediate	category	weakening	the	
																																																								
60		Ronald	Dworkin,	Taking	Rights	Seriously	(New	impr.	corr.	with	appendix:	a	reply	to	critics.	edn	Duckworth	1978)	185ff,	267ff.	
61		 Jonathan	 Verschuuren,	 Principles	 of	 Environmental	 Law:	 The	 Ideal	 of	 Sustainable	
Development	 and	 the	 Role	 of	 Principles	 of	 International,	 European,	 and	 National	
Environmental	Law	(Nomos-Verl.-Ges	2003)	38,	43.	Verschuuren	lists	nine	functions	
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dichotomy	between	norms	and	principles:	a	category	‘of	rules	of	an	indeterminate	nature,	which	may	be	set	against	rules	of	complete	and	precise	content’.62	He	reckons	the	principles	in	environmental	law	to	be	so	strong	that	they	are	more	normative	than	principles	in	the	Dworkinian	sense.63	Ebbesson	has	suggested	an	alternative	trichotomy	replacing	the	one	offered	by	Dworkin.	His	structure	consists	of	(a)	‘balancing	norms’,	(b)	‘goal	oriented	norms’	and	(c)	‘fixed	norms’—reconstructing	the	dichotomy	in	the	footsteps	of	Aarnio.64	Finally,	Beyerlin,	while	trying	to	‘haul	them	[environmental	principles:	e.g.	precaution,	polluter	pays,	or	sustainable	development]	out	of	the	sphere	of	twilight’,	ends	up	with	the	conclusion	that	whether	norms	are	rules,	principles	or	policies	is	ultimately	irrelevant:	of	pivotal	relevance	is	the	
																																																																																																																																																																							that	principles	have	in	the	legal	order—each	representing	the	idea	of	principles	and	rules	laying	at	the	respective	ends	of	the	same	sliding	scale,	ibid	49–50.	
62		Nicolas	de	Sadeleer,	Environmental	Principles:	From	Political	Slogans	to	Legal	Rules	(Susan	Leubuscher	tr,	Oxford	University	Press	2002)	308–9.	
63	Ibid	308.	
64		 Jonas	 Ebbesson,	 Compatibility	 of	 International	 and	 National	 Environmental	 Law	(Iustus	förlag	1996)	86–91;	Aulis	Aarnio	'Taking	Rules	Seriously'	(Archiv	für	Rechts-	und	 Sozialphilosophie,	 Beiheft	 42	 1990)	 in	 which	 Aarnio	 reconstructed	 the	dichotomy	between	norms	and	principles.	
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capacity	the	norms	have	to	guide	decisions,	interpretations	or	applications	of	existing	rules.65		
3.2.1	Principles,	aims,	policies,	goals…	what	else	is	there?		All	the	above-mentioned	scholars	have	made	significant	strides	in	our	understanding	of	the	nature	of	environmental	legal	principles.	But	since	in	the	present	article	the	aim-setting	sections—seen	as	that	part	of	the	legal	order	in	which	the	principles	are	filtered	and	sorted—are	central	to	our	concerns,	the	focus	here	will	be	placed	less	on	defining	whether	the	aim-setting	sections	are	principles,	rules	or	something	in	between,	and	more	on	solving	how	Dworkin	and	his	followers’	theories	could	help	in	the	application	of	the	aim-setting	sections.	That	application,	then	again,	ought	to	reveal	the	value	choices	that	are	currently	left	tacit	in,	for	example,	the		ecological	analyses	conducted	according	to	the	WFD.	Legal	principles	as	Dworkin	presented	them	are	separated	from	rules	by	the	dimension	of	weighing	and	balancing.66	Principles,	then	again,	can	be	distinguished	
																																																								
65	Ulrich	Beyerlin	 in	 ’Different	Types	of	Norms	 in	 International	Environmental	Law:	Policies,	 Principles,	 and	 Rules’	 Jutta	 Brunnée,	 Daniel	 Bodansky	 and	 Ellen	 Hey,	The	
Oxford	Handbook	of	International	Environmental	Law	(Oxford	University	Press	2007)	426,	446−47.	
66	Dworkin,	Taking	Rights	Seriously	(n	60)	24–27.	
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from	goals:	a	goal	is	a	political	aim	not	yet	separated	and	singled	out.67	And,	most	importantly:	principles	describe	rights,	policies	describe	goals—rights	are	the	rights	of	an	individual,	while	goals	are	more	collective	in	nature.	68	Rights	can	be	either	abstract	or	concrete,	the	former	lacking	any	indication	of	how	they	might	be	balanced	with	other	rights,	the	latter	being	more	precisely	defined	and	more	readily	applicable	when	seeking	a	definitive	solution.		 The	key	question	for	present	purposes	is	whether	the	aim-setting	sections	could	be	seen	as	Dworkinian	principles.	They	do	share	some	qualities	Dworkin	added	to	principles:	they	are	individualised,	setting	an	aim	distinguishable	from	a	general	political	aim	by	reason	of	being	more	defined.	Whether	the	aim-setting	sections	are	specific	enough	to	be	used	for	weighing	and	balancing	is	less	clear.	In	most	cases,	the	aims	are	specified	in	several	sub-sections,	written	with	more	precision	than	the	principles	in	common	use.	The	aim-setting	sections	do	have	one	quality	that	principles	in	general	do	not	have	(or	even	need	to	have):	they	are	institutionalised,	indeed	to	a	rather	high	level	in	the	legislative	hierarchy.	Emphasising	this	would	bring	joy	even	to	positivists:	indeed	Kelsen,	Aarnio	and	the	others	are	the	reason	why	this	neglect	of	the	aim-setting	sections	became	a	problem	in	the	first	place.69	
																																																								
67	And	 furthermore,	a	political	aim	 is	a	 ‘generic	political	 justification’	and	a	political	right	‘an	individuated	political	aim’.	Ibid	91.		
68	Ibid	90.	
69	Aarnio,	The	Rational	as	Reasonable	(n	30),	Kelsen,	Reine	Rechtslehre	(n	34).	
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	 As	stated,	Dworkin	uses	rights	and	principles	to	guard	the	individual’s	sphere	of	freedom	from	state	intervention.	The	idea	of	a	small-scale	government	fits	poorly	with	the	reality	of	environmental	legislation,	which	is	justified	by	recourse	to	more	sceptical	(or	realistic,	depending	on	the	point	of	view)	political	theory.70	Environmental	regulation	works	from	quite	a	different	viewpoint	to	society	than	Dworkin	had	in	mind	when	writing	about	principles—Hobbesian	command	and	control	regulation	is	not	what	a	liberal	would	choose.		Nonetheless,	the	aim-setting	sections	used	in	the	environmental	legislation	do	bear	resemblance	to	Dworkinian	principles.	Moreover,	this	should	not	really	be	a	surprise.	Dworkin	developed	the	theory	of	principles	to	safeguard	fully	the	individual	in	situations	where	rules	had	failed	in	that	task.71	Similarly,	the	aim-setting	sections	can	be	used	to	comply	fully	with	the	values	motivating	the	statute:	if	the	application	of	rules	fails	to	fulfill	the	objective	stipulated	in	the	aim-setting	sections,	using	these	
																																																								
70	The	bulk	of	environmental	regulation	can	be	said	to	be	Hobbesian	in	that	it	is	based	on	 a	 conception	 of	 egocentric	 actors	 pursuing	 only	 their	 own	 interest	 and	disregarding	 others.	 The	 state	 is	 needed	 to	 hinder	 such	 behavior	 with	 restrictive	regulation.	In	other	words,	the	more	optimistic	view	the	scholar	has	of	self-regulation	of	actors,	 the	more	willing	they	seem	to	be	to	 limit	the	restrictive	actions	of	a	state.	For	 an	 example,	 see	 David	 B.	 Spence,	 ’Paradox	 Lost:	 Logic,	 Morality,	 and	 the	Foundations	of	Environmental	Law	 in	 the	21st	Century’	 (1995)	Columbia	 Journal	of	Environmental	Law	20(1)	145.	
71	Dworkin,	Taking	Rights	Seriously	(n	60)	xi–xii,	184ff.	
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sections	as	if	they	were	principles	could	bring	the	expressed	objectives	closer.	Thus	the	analogy	between	principles	and	the	aim-setting	statutes	could	be	defended	and	legal	ecology	would	have	a	readily	adaptable	template	to	employ.		
3.2.2	The	recipe:	phase	to	phase		Even	though	Dworkin’s	theory	is	widely	circulated	amongst	environmental	legal	scholars	it	is	surprising	how	little	traction	Alexy’s	work	has	gained.	Alexy	is	the	scholar	whose	writings	best	complement	Dworkin’s	work.	For	example,	the	usage	of	principles	is	quite	commonly	criticised	for	a	lack	of	precision:	it	is	even	claimed	that	the	relevant	weighing	and	balancing	is	irrational	activity—deliberations	lacking	rational	standards	of	application.72	Alexy	reckons	this	argumentation-theoretical	criticism	to	be	most	important	critique	of	the	principles	theory.	For	Alexy,	who	modifies	the	principles	theory,	the	balancing	of	principles	is	neither	decisive	nor	subjective.73	According	to	Alexy,	the	difference	between	the	application	of	rules	and	
																																																								
72	Jürgen	Habermas,	Between	 facts	and	norms:	 contributions	 to	a	discourse	 theory	of	
law	and	democracy	(Polity	Press	1996)	259.	
73 	According	 to	 Alexy,	 there	 are	 three	 aspects	 in	 his	 theory	 which	 defend	 its	rationality:	the	pareto-optimality	of	balancing,	the	Law	of	Balancing	(i.e.	‘The	greater	
the	 degree	 of	 non-satisfaction	 of,	 or	 detriment	 to,	 one	 principle,	 the	 greater	 the	
importance	 of	 satisfying	 the	 other.’)	 and	 the	 Weight	 Formula.	 See	 Robert	 Alexy,	 A	
Theory	of	Constitutional	Rights	(Julian	Rivers	tr,	Oxford	University	Press	2002)	67–9	
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principles	is	a	function	of	their	intrinsic	nature.	While	rules	are	definite,	principles	form	prima	facie	requirements:	they	ought	to	be	fullfilled	to	the	greatest	extent	that	is	legally	and	factually	possible.	Principles	themselves	do	not	solve	the	dilemma	of	how	the	relation	between	reason	and	counter-reason—one	principle	and	a	competing	principle—should	be	decided.74		Alexy	offers	a	more	nuanced	structure	for	the	weighing	and	balancing	of	principles.	According	to	him,	when	it	comes	to	competing	principles,	cases	can	be	resolved	with	step-by-step	logical	reasoning	similar	to	the	application	of	rules.	Principles	produce	an	optimisation	requirement,	which	should	be	applied	rigorously.75	To	extend	this	very	procedure	to	the	application	of	the	aim-setting	sections	leads	to	the	improvement	legal	ecology	approach	might	present:	writing	out	this	step-by-step	logical	reasoning	equates	with	open-ended	argumentation	and	transparent	lines	of	thought.	According	to	Alexy,	applying	various	principles	results	in	rule-like	rulings:	the	Law	of	Competing	Principles	is	a	rule	which	mends	the	case	of	competing	principles:	‘the	circumstances	under	which	one	principle	takes	precedence	over	another	
constitute	the	conditions	of	a	rule	which	has	the	same	legal	consequences	as	the	
																																																																																																																																																																							and	102,	respectively.	And	on	an	evaluation	of	the	criticism	of	these,	see	Robert	Alexy,	'Legal	 Rules,	 Legal	 Principles	 and	 the	 Construction	 of	 Constitutional	 Rights'	(Tampere,	Helsinki	8.-10.2.2010	2010)	7.	
74	Alexy,	A	Theory	of	Constitutional	Rights	(n	73)	47,	57.		
75	Ibid	52.	
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principle	taking	precedence’.76	In	other	words,	after	principles	have	been	optimised	and	a	conclusion	reached,	this	conclusion	forms	a	rule	according	to	which	the	case	must	be	solved.	The	circumstances	include	both	the	rules	and	principles	significant	for	the	ruling:	the	circumstances	form	a	network	of	arguments	from	which	the	ruling	is	reasoned.77	Nevertheless,	emphasising	circumstances	does	not,	in	Alexy’s	view,	lead	to	ad	hoc	decisions.		The	interpretation-theoretical	criticism	is	based	on	the	assumption	that	the	systematic	and	hierarchical	structures	of	principles	and	rules	would	not	withstand	the	act	of	balancing.78	However,	if	the	Weight	Formula—a	formula	for	showing	how	the	rationality	of	balancing	occurs—is	fully	considered,	it	is	seen	that	the	specific	weight	of	a	principle	is	a	relative	concept.	It	relates	to	competing	principles	and	to	the	intensity	of	interference	with	them.	The	balancing	is,	
																																																								
76	Ibid	54	(emphasis	added).	There	are	naturally	other	ways	to	criticize	and	nuance	Dworkin’s	 clear	 separation	 between	 principles	 and	 rules.	 E.g.	 according	 to	 Aarnio,	rules	and	principles	form	a	cline	that	can	be	divided	in	four:	’rules	proper’,	’rule-like	principles’,	 ’principle-like-rules’	 and	 ’principles	 proper’,	 see	 Aarnio,	 Taking	 Rules	
Seriously	(n	64)	184.	He	also	gives	examples	of	positive	legal	principles,	dividing	them	into	 ’formally	 valid	 principles’,	 ’legal	 generalizations’,	 ’decision-making	 principles’	and	’extrasystemic	principles’,	Aarnio,	Taking	Rules	Seriously	(n	64)	183–84.	
77	Professor	 Raimo	 Siltala	 helped	 to	 form	 this	 clarification.	 The	 structure	 exists	because	judges	must	reach	a	verdict;	the	case	cannot	be	left	unsolved.		
78	Alexy	 'Legal	Rules,	Legal	Principles	and	 the	Construction	of	Constitutional	Rights’	(n	73)	6−7.	
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in	other	words,	a	formal	structure	without	intrinsic	substance:	it	could	be	called	the	Epistemic	Law	of	Balancing.79	This	structure	leads	to	a	situation	where	the	usage	of	principles	affects	the	circumstances	of	subsequent	rulings:	the	rulings	given	have	an	impact	on	the	later	decision-making	situations.	The	network	is	rooted	in	time	in	much	the	same	way	as	preliminary	rulings	are	in	common-law	cultures.	Often	arguments	
underlying	the	weighing	and	balancing—i.e.	the	rules	according	to	which	arguments	are	chosen	to	be	balanced—are	left	unseen.	Feteris	has	presented	an	elegant	reconstruction	through	which	such	goals	of	legal	system	can	be	made	explicit.	80		In	legal	ecology	the	aim-setting	sections	serve	as	authoritative	legal	decisions	expressing	these	system-goals.81	Discussion	of	principles	is	nothing	new,	and	principles	in	a	broad	sense	are	widely	invoked	in	the	field	of	environmental	law.	What	does	it	bring	about	when	the	
																																																								
79	The	 Weight	 Formula	 is	 the	 second	 law	 regarding	 balancing,	 the	 first	 being	 the	(Substantive)	 Law	 of	 Balancing	 which	 states	 ‘The	 greater	 the	 degree	 of	 non-satisfaction	 of,	 or	 detriment	 to,	 one	 right	 or	 principle,	 the	 greater	 must	 be	 the	importance	 of	 satisfying	 the	 other.’	 Alexy,	 A	 Theory	 of	 Constitutional	 Rights	 (n	73)	102,	Robert	Alexy	'On	Balancing	and	Subsumption.	A	Structural	Comparison'	(2003)	16(4)	Ratio	Juris	433,	446.	
80	Eveline	T.	Feteris,	 ’The	Rational	Reconstruction	of	Weighing	and	Balancing	on	the	Basis	 of	 Teleological-Evaluative	 Considerations	 in	 the	 Justification	 of	 Judicial	Decisions’	(2008)	21	Ratio	Juris	481,	498-92.		
81	See	text	at	fn	(53)ff	and	(83)ff.	
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aim-setting	sections	are	employed	like	legal	principles?	An	illustrative	answer	is	given	below:	the	interpretation	of	the	concept	of	pollution	in	the	Finnish	Environmental	Protection	Act	(EPA82)—the	implementing	decree	of	the	Intergrated	Emissions	Directive	(IED)83—is	reframed	with	reference	to	legal	ecology.		
3.3	Go!	—legal	ecology	at	work		The	most	notable	difference	between	principles	in	environmental	law	and	the	aim-setting	sections	hinge	upon	the	institutionalised	position	and	the	greater	precision	of	the	latter.	When	the	aim-setting	sections	are	adopted	into	law	they	are	written	in	a	more	detailed	manner	than	the	general	environmental	principles	usually	are—if	the	latter	have	been	codified	in	the	first	place.	For	example,	the	aim-setting	section	of	Finnish	EPA	is	divided	into	seven	paragraphs,	each	defining	which	parts	of	eco-sustainability	ought	to	be	considered:	the	aims	are	preventing	pollution,	repairing	
																																																								
82	Repealed	 Environmental	 Protection	 Act	 3.1.1	 §	 (2000/86)	 is	 available	 in	 English	<http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2000/en20000086.pdf>,	 unfortunately	its	 replacement	 from	 2014	 has	 not	 yet	 been	 officially	 translated	 (527/2014,	http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/2014/20140527)	(n	46).	The	concept	of	pollution	has	remained	practically	intact.	
83 	Directive	 2010/75/EU	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	24	November	 2010	 on	 industrial	 emissions	 (integrated	 pollution	 prevention	and	control)	OJ	L	334,	17.12.2010,	p.	17–119.		
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possible	damage,	safeguarding	a	healthy	environment,	integrating	impact	assessments	of	polluting	activities	and	so	forth.84	When	compared	with	more	general	environmental	principles,	it	can	be	seen	that	in	the	aim-setting	sections	the	principles	are	sorted,	objectives	filtered	and	aims	specified	in	greater	detail.	The	concepts	of	pollution	and	of	emission	were	given	an	EU-wide	definition	with	the	IPPC	Directive	back	in	1996.85	According	to	the	definition,	‘“pollution”	means	the	direct	or	indirect	introduction,	as	a	result	of	human	activity,	of	substances…	into…water	or	land	which	may	be	harmful	to…the	quality	of	the	environment…’.86	The	
																																																								
84 Environmental	 Protection	 Act	 (86/2000)	 1	§,	 sub-section	 1).	<http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2000/en20000086.pdf>	 accessed	 18	February	2014.	
85	Directive	 2008/1/EC	 Of	 The	 European	 Parliament	 and	 Of	 The	 Council	 Of	 15	January	2008	Concerning	 Integrated	Pollution	Prevention	And	Control	−	definitions	are	at	Article	2(2)	and	2(5).	The	definitions	have	remained	practically	the	same	also	when	the	IED	Directive	replaced	the	IPPC	at	2014,	see	Directive	2010/75/EU	Of	The	European	 Parliament	 And	 Of	 The	 Council	 Of	 24	 November	 2010	 On	 Industrial	Emissions	(Integrated	Pollution	Prevention	And	Control),	Articles	3(2)	and	3(4).	
86	Ibid,	IED	Directive	Articles	3(2)	and	3(4).	
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definition	has	been	transposed	into	Finnish	legislation	as	is,	except	for	insignificant	modifications.87		 This	definition	has	been	one	of	the	core	issues	in	cases	concerning	permissions	for	peat	production.	In	this	form	of	local	energy	production	conducted	in	Finland,	peat	is	excavated	out	of	mire	and	burned	to	produce	energy.	Excavating	peat	causes	pollution	to	nearby	waters	and	on	downstream	waters	and	land	mainly	via	the	run-off	waters	containing	humus,	an	organic	matter.	Once	the	mire	is	opened	and	the	peat	excavated,	the	mire	will	become	swampy	once	more	in	5,000–10,000	years.	Peat	production	is	regulated	by	environmental	permits	granted	according	to	the	EPA	and	lower	regulations	based	on	it.88		 The	SAC	has	adopted	a	stance	in	which	the	environmental	harm	that	the	production	causes	to	the	mire	itself	cannot	be	considered	to	be	pollution	in	the	sense	of	either	the	IPPC/IED	Directive	or	the	EPA.89	In	these	rulings,	the	court	states	that	
																																																								
87	Environmental	Protection	Act	(86/2000)	3.1	§,	sub-section	1).	<http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2000/en20000086.pdf>	accessed	18	February	2014.	
88	Permits	 according	 to	 the	Water	 Act	 (587/2011)	 are	 usually	 also	 needed	 for	 the	trenches	 dug	 through	 and	 adjacent	 to	 the	 production	 site.	 Water	 Act	 (587/2011)	(In	Finnish)	 <http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/ajantasa/2011/20110587>	 accessed	 18	February	2014.	
89 	See	 KHO	 2005:27	 <http://www.kho.fi/paatokset/31421.htm>	 accessed	 18	February	2014.	
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the	harm	the	activity	causes	on	the	activity	area	itself	by	physically	changing	the	area	without	emissions	elsewhere	falls	beyond	the	sphere	of	the	IPPC	or	the	EPA.90	Scholars	have	poured	scorn	on	the	SAC	for	its	stance,	arguing	that	the	SAC	unnecessarily	restricts	the	interpretation	of	the	definition	of	pollution.91			 Would	the	end	result	be	any	different	if	the	case	were	to	be	adjudicated	by	deploying	legal	ecology?	If	the	aims	at	EPA	1	§	were	taken	seriously,	the	first	step	would	be	to	define	the	relevant	aims:	safeguarding	a	healthy,	pleasant	and	ecologically	diverse	and	sustainable	environment;	promoting	sustainable	use	of	natural	resources;	and	preventing	pollution	or	repairing	and	reducing	the	damage	it	causes	would	seem	to	be	the	three	most	relevant	ones.92	On	the	other	hand,	a	more	
																																																								
90	Ibid	KHO	2005:27,	summary.	
91		 Ismo	 Pölönen,	 Ympäristövaikutusten	 arviointimenettely:	 tutkimus	 YVA-menettelyn	
oikeudellisesta	 asemasta	 ja	 kehittämistarpeista	 ympäristöllisen	 vaikuttavuuden	
näkökulmasta	(Suomalainen	lakimiesyhdistys,	2007).	The	work	is	on	EIA	and	thus	the	study	is	mainly	concerned	with	the	problems	the	stance	causes	for	the	application	of	EIA.	 Interestingly,	 the	 author	 still	 reckons	 one	 problem	 to	 be	 that	 the	 current	standing	of	the	SAC	restricts	the	fulfillment	of	the	aims	of	the	EPA.		ibid	162,	fn	104.	
92	EPA	1	§	sub-sections	1),	2)	and	6).	<http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2000/en20000086.pdf>	accessed	18	February	2014.	
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general	principle	can	also	be	found	based	on	constitutional	rights:	the	right	to	earn	one’s	livelihood	by	a	chosen	activity.93	After	setting	out	the	competing	principles	the	justification	of	the	adjudication	would	then	proceed	with	the	Law	of	Balancing	and	its	three	steps:	1)	defining	the	detriment	to	the	first	principle,	2)	defining	the	importance	of	the	competing	principle;	3)	deciding	whether	the	importance	of	satisfying	the	competing	principle	justifies	the	detriment	to	the	first	principle.94	The	first	and	second	stage—the	intensity	of	the	interference	and	the	degree	of	importance—would	be	set	on	a	triadic	scale	as	either	light,	medium	or	strong.	The	act	of	balancing	would	not	be	fulfilled	if	the	Weight	Formula	was	not	applied:	‘[t]he	more	heavily	an	interference	with	a	constitutional	right	weighs,	the	greater	must	be	the	certainty	of	its	underlying	premisses.’95	In	the	Weight	Formula,	the	abstract	weights	of	competing	principles	or	aims	turn	into	specific	or	relative	weights.96	Thus	in	this	stage	of	the	interpretive	analysis	the	
																																																								
93	Constitution	of	Finland	(731/1999)	18	§.	<http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf>	accessed	18	February	2014.	
94	Alexy,	‘On	Balancing	and	Subsumption’	(n	79)	436–37.	In	other	words	the	first	step	concerns	the	intensity	of	the	interference,	the	second	the	degrees	of	importance	and	the	 third	 their	 relationship	 to	 each	other.	 It	makes	no	difference	which	principle	 is	chosen	to	be	the	first,	or	which	is	the	competing	one.	
95	Ibid	446.	
96	Ibid	444.	
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dilemma	is	no	longer	one	of	the	substantive	importance	of	different	aims	but	of	their	
relative	importance;	their	importance	in	the	current	circumstance	when	compared	with	other	factors	in	the	case.97	Applying	this	approach	would	at	least	mean	a	more	thorough	degree	of	argumentation	in	the	cases	coming	before	the	SAC.	Instead	of	simply	extrapolating	some	actions	from	the	concept	of	‘pollution’,	the	SAC	would	be	forced	to	contextualise	the	issue.	Through	fitting	the	aims	in	EPA	1	§	and	the	constitutional	right	to	earn	one’s	living	in	the	formal	structure	of	the	Weight	Formula,	the	SAC	would	need	openly	to	rationalise	its	adjudication.	Would	the	detriment	to	the	aim	of	‘safeguarding	an	ecologically	diverse	environment’	be	light,	medium	or	strong?	Where	would	the	right	to	‘earn	one’s	livelihood’	come,	using	the	same	scale?	Would	its	weight	in	the	situation	be	enough	to	justify	the	damage	caused	to	the	first-mentioned	of	these	aims?		We	can	see	then	how	legal	ecology	changes	the	reasoning	of	cases.	Secondly,	legal	ecology	brings	to	the	surface	and	forces	the	writing	out	of	the	tangible	ecological	situation	behind	every	case.	Even	though	adjudication	of	environmental	cases	has	
																																																								
97	This	is	also	the	beauty	of	the	Weight	Formula:	it	solves	the	deadlocks	the	abstract	weights	(which	in	many	cases	do	not	differ	from	each	other)	cause	and	gives	tools	for	‘realizing	 as	 much	 rationality	 in	 legal	 argumentation	 as	 possible’,	 as	 Alexy	 puts	 it,		Alexy	'On	Balancing	and	Subsumption'	(n	79)	433-48.		
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long	been	known	for	its	openness	to	teleological	argumentation,98	in	legal	ecology	the	reality	for	which	judicial	decisions	are	made	is	already	present	while	the	legal	argumentation	is	formed.	And	thirdly,	with	legal	ecology	the	motivating	ideas	behind	environmental	regulation	can	be	critically	evaluated	in	course	of	legal	argumentation	itself	and	so	be	realised	to	the	fullest	extent	in	each	individual	circumstance.			4	CONCLUSIONS		In	conclusion,	it	can	be	stated	that	the	aim-setting	sections	of	law	ought	to	be	taken	as	clarifications	of	broader	principles	in	environmental	law.	The	principles,	policies	or	goals	motivating	environmental	regulation	are	filtered	and	sorted	in	the	aim-setting	sections.	Taking	them	seriously	is	the	most	efficient	way	to	give	substance	to	the	values	behind	the	regulation.	As	noted,	this	would	also	obstruct	us	from	hiding	value	choices	at,	for	example,	the	management	planning	stage	where	the	choices	are	not	made	visible	or	open	to	(judicial)	review.99	Secondly,	it	can	be	concluded	that	the	aim-setting	sections	ought	to	be	seen	as	optimisation	requirements:	they	‘can	be	satisfied	to	various	degrees,	and…	the	
																																																								
98	Fisher,	Legal	Reasoning	in	Environmental	Law	(n	30),	34	and	161	with	an	example	of	international	environmental	law	conventions.	
99		See	text	at	fn	(41).	
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appropriate	degree	of	satisfaction	depends	not	only	on	what	is	factually	possible	but	also	on	what	is	legally	possible’.100	Thirdly,	the	optimisation	requirement	is	fulfilled	by	the	weighing	and	balancing	of	the	competing	values	or	objectives	that	lie	behind	the	legislation,	some	of	which	are	written	down	in	the	aim-setting	sections.	This	weighing	and	balancing	can	be	performed	formally,	rather	like	more	familiar	reasoning	with	fixed	rules.101	This	approach	ought	to	be	part	of	all	judicial	decision-making	with	those	pieces	of	environmental	legislation	presenting	the	possibility	of	it.	Properly	conducted	weighing	and	balancing	of	values	would	compel	logical	structuring	of	also	that	part	of	adjudication	that	might	even	have	been	regarded	as	irrational.102	At	the	law-enacting	stage	it	brings	to	an	end	any	presuppositions—were	such	assumptions	to	be	made—that	the	scientific	evaluation	of	data	is		free	of	value	choice.	It	is	not,	as	the	previous	example	from	the	WFD	indicates.103	By	fulfilling	these	objectives,	environmental	judicial	decision-making	in	civil	law	systems	might	be	better	placed	to	meet	the	challenges	brought	by	the	
																																																								
100	Alexy,	A	Theory	of	Constitutional	Rights	(n	73)	47–8.	
101	The	difference	between	 the	more	 familiar	Subsumption	Formula	and	 the	Weight	Formula	is	that	the	former	follows	the	rules	of	logic,	the	latter	the	rules	of	arithmetic,	i.e.	the	first-mentioned	represents	a	classifying	dimension	of	legal	reasoning,	the	last-mentioned	a	graduated	one.	Alexy,	‘On	Balancing	and	Subsumption’	(n	79)	448.	
102	See	text	at	fn	(72).	
103	See	text	at	and	from	fn	(33).	
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deterioration	of	ecosystems.	It	also	might	be	that	the	most	efficient	way	to	bring	about	a	paradigmatic	shift	would	be	to	argue	for	a	change	in	the	kind	of	judicial	decision-making	which	is	carried	out	on	a	daily	basis.	
